











Department of Economics 




Climate Change Impacts on Waterfowl Habitat 
 in Western Canada 
 









Copyright 2011 by G.C. van Kooten, P. Withey and L. Wong.  All rights reserved. Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. REPA Working Papers: 
2003-01 – Compensation for Wildlife Damage: Habitat Conversion, Species Preservation and Local 
Welfare (Rondeau and Bulte) 
2003-02 – Demand for Wildlife Hunting in British Columbia (Sun, van Kooten and Voss) 
2003-03 – Does Inclusion of Landowners’ Non-Market Values Lower Costs of Creating Carbon 
Forest Sinks? (Shaikh, Suchánek, Sun and van Kooten) 
2003-04 – Smoke and Mirrors: The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond (van Kooten) 
2003-05 – Creating Carbon Offsets in Agriculture through No-Till Cultivation: A Meta-Analysis of 
Costs and Carbon Benefits (Manley, van Kooten, Moeltne, and Johnson) 
2003-06 – Climate Change and Forest Ecosystem Sinks: Economic Analysis (van Kooten and Eagle) 
2003-07 – Resolving Range Conflict in Nevada? The Potential for Compensation via Monetary 
Payouts and Grazing Alternatives (Hobby and van Kooten) 
2003-08 – Social Dilemmas and Public Range Management: Results from the Nevada Ranch Survey 
(van Kooten, Thomsen, Hobby and Eagle) 
2004-01 – How Costly are Carbon Offsets? A Meta-Analysis of Forest Carbon Sinks (van Kooten, 
Eagle, Manley and Smolak) 
2004-02 – Managing Forests for Multiple Tradeoffs: Compromising on Timber, Carbon and 
Biodiversity Objectives (Krcmar, van Kooten and Vertinsky) 
2004-03 – Tests of the EKC Hypothesis using CO2 Panel Data (Shi) 
2004-04 – Are Log Markets Competitive? Empirical Evidence and Implications for Canada-U.S. 
Trade in Softwood Lumber (Niquidet and van Kooten) 
2004-05 – Conservation Payments under Risk: A Stochastic Dominance Approach (Benítez, 
Kuosmanen, Olschewski and van Kooten) 
2004-06 – Modeling Alternative Zoning Strategies in Forest Management (Krcmar, Vertinsky and 
van Kooten) 
2004-07 – Another Look at the Income Elasticity of Non-Point Source Air Pollutants: A 
Semiparametric Approach (Roy and van Kooten) 
2004-08 – Anthropogenic and Natural Determinants of the Population of a Sensitive Species: Sage 
Grouse in Nevada (van Kooten, Eagle and Eiswerth) 
2004-09 – Demand for Wildlife Hunting in British Columbia (Sun, van Kooten and Voss) 
2004-10 – Viability of Carbon Offset Generating Projects in Boreal Ontario (Biggs and Laaksonen- 
Craig) 
2004-11 – Economics of Forest and Agricultural Carbon Sinks (van Kooten) 
2004-12 – Economic Dynamics of Tree Planting for Carbon Uptake on Marginal Agricultural Lands 
(van Kooten) (Copy of paper published in the Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 48(March): 51-65.) 
2004-13 – Decoupling Farm Payments: Experience in the US, Canada, and Europe (Ogg and van 
Kooten) 
2004–14– Afforestation Generated Kyoto Compliant Carbon Offsets: A Case Study in Northeastern 
Ontario (Biggs) 
2005–01– Utility-scale Wind Power: Impacts of Increased Penetration (Pitt, van Kooten, Love and 
Djilali) 
2005–02 –Integrating Wind Power in Electricity Grids: An Economic Analysis (Liu, van Kooten and 
Pitt) 
2005–03 –Resolving Canada-U.S. Trade Disputes in Agriculture and Forestry: Lessons from Lumber 
(Biggs, Laaksonen-Craig, Niquidet and van Kooten) 2005–04–Can Forest Management Strategies Sustain the Development Needs of the Little Red River 
Cree First Nation? (Krcmar, Nelson, van Kooten, Vertinsky and Webb) 
2005–05–Economics of Forest and Agricultural Carbon Sinks (van Kooten) 
2005–06– Divergence Between WTA & WTP Revisited: Livestock Grazing on Public Range (Sun, 
van Kooten and Voss) 
2005–07 –Dynamic Programming and Learning Models for Management of a Nonnative Species 
(Eiswerth, van Kooten, Lines and Eagle) 
2005–08 –Canada-US Softwood Lumber Trade Revisited: Examining the Role of Substitution Bias 
in the Context of a Spatial Price Equilibrium Framework (Mogus, Stennes and van 
Kooten) 
2005–09 –Are Agricultural Values a Reliable Guide in Determining Landowners’ Decisions to 
Create Carbon Forest Sinks?* (Shaikh, Sun and van Kooten) *Updated version of 
Working Paper 2003-03 
2005–10 –Carbon Sinks and Reservoirs: The Value of Permanence and Role of Discounting (Benitez 
and van Kooten) 
2005–11 –Fuzzy Logic and Preference Uncertainty in Non-Market Valuation (Sun and van Kooten) 
2005–12 –Forest Management Zone Design with a Tabu Search Algorithm (Krcmar, Mitrovic-Minic, 
van Kooten and Vertinsky) 
2005–13 –Resolving Range Conflict in Nevada? Buyouts and Other Compensation Alternatives (van 
Kooten, Thomsen and Hobby) *Updated version of Working Paper 2003-07 
2005–14 –Conservation Payments Under Risk: A Stochastic Dominance Approach (Benítez, 
Kuosmanen, Olschewski and van Kooten) *Updated version of Working Paper 2004-05 
2005–15 –The Effect of Uncertainty on Contingent Valuation Estimates: A Comparison (Shaikh, Sun 
and van Kooten) 
2005–16 –Land Degradation in Ethiopia: What do Stoves Have to do with it? (Gebreegziabher, van 
Kooten and.van Soest) 
2005–17 –The Optimal Length of an Agricultural Carbon Contract (Gulati and Vercammen) 
2006–01 –Economic Impacts of Yellow Starthistle on California (Eagle, Eiswerth, Johnson, 
Schoenig and van Kooten) 
2006–02 -The Economics of Wind Power with Energy Storage (Benitez, Dragulescu and van 
Kooten) 
2006–03 –A Dynamic Bioeconomic Model of Ivory Trade: Details and Extended Results (van 
Kooten) 
2006–04 –The Potential for Wind Energy Meeting Electricity Needs on Vancouver Island (Prescott, 
van Kooten and Zhu) 
2006–05 –Network Constrained Wind Integration: An Optimal Cost Approach (Maddaloni, Rowe 
and van Kooten) 
2006–06 –Deforestation (Folmer and van Kooten) 
2007–01 –Linking Forests and Economic Well-being: A Four-Quadrant Approach (Wang, 
DesRoches, Sun, Stennes, Wilson and van Kooten) 
2007–02 –Economics of Forest Ecosystem Forest Sinks: A Review (van Kooten and Sohngen) 
2007–03 –Costs of Creating Carbon Offset Credits via Forestry Activities: A Meta-Regression 
Analysis (van Kooten, Laaksonen-Craig and Wang) 
2007–04 –The Economics of Wind Power: Destabilizing an Electricity Grid with Renewable Power 
(Prescott and van Kooten) 
2007–05 –Wind Integration into Various Generation Mixtures (Maddaloni, Rowe and van Kooten) 
2007–06 –Farmland Conservation in The Netherlands and British Columbia, Canada: A Comparative 
Analysis Using GIS-based Hedonic Pricing Models (Cotteleer, Stobbe and van Kooten) 2007–07 –Bayesian Model Averaging in the Context of Spatial Hedonic Pricing: An Application to 
Farmland Values (Cotteleer, Stobbe and van Kooten) 
2007–08 –Challenges for Less Developed Countries: Agricultural Policies in the EU and the US 
(Schure, van Kooten and Wang) 
2008–01 –Hobby Farms and Protection of Farmland in British Columbia (Stobbe, Eagle and van 
Kooten) 
2008-01A-Hobby Farm’s and British Columbia’s Agricultural Land Reserve  
(Stobbe, Eagle, Cotteleer and van Kooten) 
2008–02 –An Economic Analysis of Mountain Pine Beetle Impacts in a Global Context (Abbott, 
     Stennes and van Kooten) 
2008–03 –Regional Log Market Integration in New Zealand (Niquidet and Manley) 
2008–04 –Biological Carbon Sequestration and Carbon Trading Re-Visited (van Kooten) 
2008–05 –On Optimal British Columbia Log Export Policy: An Application of Trade theory (Abbott) 
2008–06 –Expert Opinion versus Transaction Evidence: Using the Reilly Index to Measure Open 
                  Space premiums in the Urban-Rural Fringe (Cotteleer, Stobbe and van Kooten) 
2008–07 –Forest-mill Integration: a Transaction Costs Perspective (Niquidet and O’Kelly)  
2008–08 –The Economics of Endangered Species Poaching (Abbott) 
2008–09 –The Ghost of Extinction: Preservation Values and Minimum Viable Population in Wildlife 
Models (van Kooten and Eiswerth) 
2008–10 –Corruption, Development and the Curse of Natural Resources (Pendergast, Clarke and van 
Kooten) 
2008–11 –Bio-energy from Mountain Pine Beetle Timber and Forest Residuals: The Economics 
Story (Niquidet, Stennes and van Kooten) 
2008-12 –Biological Carbon Sinks: Transaction Costs and Governance (van Kooten) 
2008-13 –Wind Power Development: Opportunities and Challenges (van Kooten and Timilsina) 
2009-01 –Can Domestication of Wildlife Lead to Conservation? The Economics of Tiger Farming in 
China (Abbott and van Kooten) 
2009-02 – Implications of Expanding Bioenergy Production from Wood in British Columbia: An 
Application of a Regional Wood Fibre Allocation Model (Stennes, Niquidet and van 
Kooten) 
2009-03 – Linking Matlab and GAMS: A Supplement (Wong) 
2009-04 – Wind Power: The Economic Impact of Intermittency (van Kooten) 
2009-05 – Economic Aspects of Wind Power Generation in Developing Countries (van Kooten and 
Wong) 
2009-06 – Niche and Direct Marketing in the Rural-Urban Fringe: A Study of the Agricultural 
Economy in the Shadow of a Large City (Stobbe, Eagle and van Kooten) 
2009-07 – The Economics and Policy of Global Warming (van Kooten, Beisner and Geddes) 
2010-01 – The Resource Curse: A State and Provincial Analysis (Olayele) 
2010-02 – Elephants and the Ivory Trade Ban:  Summary of Research Results (van Kooten) 
2010-03 – Managing Water Shortages in the Western Electricity Grids (Scorah, Sopinka and van 
Kooten) 
2010-04 - Bioeconomic modeling of wetlands and waterfowl in Western Canada: Accounting for 
amenity values (van Kooten, Withey and Wong) 
2010-05 – Waterfowl Harvest Benefits in Northern Aboriginal Communities and Potential Climate 
Change Impacts (Krcmar, van Kooten and Chan-McLeod) 
2011-01 – The Impact of Agriculture on Waterfowl Abundance: Evidence from Panel Data (Wong, 
van Kooten and Clarke) 2011-02 – Economic Analysis of Feed-in Tariffs for Generating Electricity from Renewable Energy 
Sources (van Kooten) 




For copies of this or other REPA working papers contact: 
REPA Research Group 
Department of Economics 




This working paper is made available by the Resource Economics and Policy Analysis (REPA) Research 
Group at the University of Victoria. REPA working papers have not been peer reviewed and contain 
preliminary research findings. They shall not be cited without the expressed written consent of the 
author(s). Page | 1 
 
Climate Change Impacts on Waterfowl Habitat in 
Western Canada 
Wetland ecosystems are important not only for producing waterfowl, but because they provide 
valuable  ecosystem services. These include filtration of agricultural and other pollutants 
(thereby improving quality of ground and even some surface waters), water for livestock and 
wildlife, opportunities for recreation, a greenhouse gas storage function, and, in addition, such 
non-market values as visual amenities. The major challenge to the management of wetlands is 
that private landowners do not and, in most instances, cannot capture all of the values that 
wetlands provide – their value to society exceeds their value to private landowners. Because of 
the externalities associated with wetlands and their protection, public policies may be required 
to protect existing wetland areas and perhaps even restore lost wetlands. 
Before implementing public policy to protect and/or restore wetlands, it is first necessary to 
determine whether existing wetlands area is indeed suboptimal from a social standpoint, and, 
second, whether government intervention is warranted. Government action to conserve 
wetlands has a cost, with government intervention warranted only if the costs of policies to 
conserve wetlands are less than the benefits to society. Further, the policies implemented by 
the government to protect and/or restore wetlands must be efficient in the sense that they 
conserve the ‘best’ wetlands (those providing the greatest benefits) at least cost to the 
treasury. This may involve the identification of desirable wetland areas to retain and/or restore 
and the use of auctions to compensate landowners for providing the wetland (Hill et al. 2011). 
In some situations, the government might wish to leave protection of wetlands to the private 
sector. Environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Ducks Unlimited, can 
bring together stakeholders (e.g., duck hunters, viewers of migratory waterfowl) to pay 
landowners for retaining and restoring wetlands. Nonetheless, government policies toward 
wetlands are important for preserving and enhancing wetland ecosystem services. 
The focus of the current report is on wetlands protection in Canada’s Prairie Provinces. Our 
primary concern relates to the conversion of wetlands area into cropland and their value in the 
provision of habitat for migratory waterfowl. The tradeoff between these alternative uses of 
wetlands will become even starker should projected climate change reduce annual 
precipitation in the study region. Although wetland ecosystem services are taken into account, 
the primary concern is the role of wetlands in providing habitat for migratory waterfowl. 
Our analysis begins in the next section with an overview of the study region and the challenges 
of wetlands protection in this region. Then, in section 2, we examine a bioeconomic model of 
duck hunting and wetlands protection to demonstrate that, even if the only benefit provided by   Page | 2 
wetlands relates to their value in producing ducks for hunters, wetlands area in the study 
region is less than socially optimal. The bioeconomic model is then expanded to include the 
amenity or ecosystem values provided by wetlands values and the viewing value of migratory 
waterfowl. Finally, in section 2, we consider what level of wetlands would need to be protected 
should climate change result in much drier conditions than those experienced during the last 
century. 
In section 3, we turn to the regional impacts of agricultural land use and wetlands retention. 
We begin that section with a bioeconomic model that is similar to that of section 2. In this case, 
however, the model is parameterized separately for each province and for each of the strata 
that are used for surveying waterfowl and wetlands (as discussed in the first section below). We 
then employ an econometric panel-data model to examine the direct and indirect impacts of 
wetlands loss on waterfowl populations. The direct impact of wetlands loss is given by the 
reduction in waterfowl population in the stratum where the wetlands are lost, while the 
indirect effect relates to the change in populations in other, nearby strata. It turns out that the 
productivity of wetlands in other strata increases slightly, indicating that there is some 
accommodation of birds that have lost their primary reproductive habitat and been forced to 
seek habitat elsewhere. However, the extent of this mitigating effect is small. 
Finally, a land-use model is developed for each strata and for the region as a whole. Nine land 
uses are modeled and positive mathematical programming is used to calibrate the model to 
observed land uses. The subsequent model is then used to simulate both the impact of climate 
change on land use (including changes in wetlands) and that of biofuel policies that seek to 
mitigate global warming. Although the land use model differs significantly from the bioecnomic 
models that are used in section 2 and subsection 3.2, the results are surprisingly similar in both 
direction and magnitude. In all cases, our models suggest that greater efforts to protect 
wetlands are warranted. 
This study complements three recent studies of wetlands protection in Canada's grain belt. In 
one study, Pattison et al. (2011) used an internet survey device to determine the willingness to 
pay of Manitobans to conserve wetlands. They find that, despite a large annual WTP, the costs 
of restoring wetlands to their 1968 level would simply not be warranted, although retention 
and restoration of some wetlands would be socially desirable. Hill et al. (2011), and Yu and 
Belcher  (2011), address the opposite side of the issue—the willingness of landowners to 
participate in wetlands retention and restoration schemes. Yu and Belcher use a survey 
instrument to determine the payments farmers would need to participate in a 10-year program 
to protect wetlands, while Hill et al use an actual reverse auction. Both studies focus on regions 
in Saskatchewan, and neither provides optimism about society’s ability to protect let alone 
restore wetlands at low costs. Wetland retention and restoration are likely to prove costly,   Page | 3 
unless spatial targeting also proves cost effective. The current study employs some of these 
results in a broader investigation of the economics of retaining wetlands in western Canada's 
grain belt when faced with the threat of global warming. 
1. The Prairie Pothole Region of Western Canada 
Canada’s Prairie Pothole Region (PPR) is part of the pothole region of North America’s Great 
Plains (Figure 1). Although the Canadian PPR represents a mere 10% of North America’s 
waterfowl breeding habitat, the region produces over 50% of the continent’s duck population 
(Baldassarre et al. 1994). Since the PPR also accounts for roughly 60% of Canada’s agricultural 
output (Statistics Canada 2006), intense competition exists between private economic interests 
and public benefits in this region. Not surprisingly, wetlands and waterfowl numbers have been 
in decline. As indicated in Figure 2, North American waterfowl populations have fallen from 
some 35 million when populations first began to be monitored in the early 1950s to almost 15 
million by the end of the first decade of the new century – a decline of more than 50 percent 
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2010a, 2010b). 
 
 
Figure 1: Prairie Pothole Region of North America 
Source: Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Centre   Page | 4 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between Wetlands and Waterfowl in Canada’s Grain Belt, 1955-2009  
Interestingly, it is the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service that monitors waterfowl populations. The 
entire pothole region in Figure 1 is divided into strata, which are used to organize waterfowl 
population data as land and climate characteristics vary across this vast region. Strata 26 
through 40 are located in western Canada’s southern grain belt as indicated in Figure 3. Also 
shown in Figure 3 are ‘transects’ that biologists use to enumerate waterfowl populations. 
Transects are laid out in a pattern that avoids double counting of birds, and biologists count 
birds along the same transects each year to ensure continuity and reliability of samples.  
Drought and climate change have been influential factors in bringing about declines in wetlands 
and thereby waterfowl numbers, but agricultural development and particularly drainage 
activities by farmers during the 20
th  century have also significantly reduced wetlands 
(Watmough and Schmoll 2007). Due to the ecological and economic benefits of preserving 
wetlands and waterfowl, an empirical examination of the effects of agricultural land use on 
waterfowl populations is worthwhile, not only for understanding the potential intensity and 
significance of these effects, but also for gaining insights for management plans that seek to 































































) Breeding ducks 
(thin line)
Ponds  Page | 5 
 
Figure 3: Transects and Strata of the Waterfowl Breeding Population and Habitat Survey  
Source: Wilkins and Cooch (1999, p.38); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (2010a, p.60) 
Consider first the expansion of cropland area. In Figure 4, we provide time series of cropland 
acreage and waterfowl numbers for the PPR; the data illustrate a possible negative relationship, 
especially after the 1970s. The picture is a little less clear when we try to break things down 
into type of cropland and its relationship to wetlands as opposed to duck populations, although 
the two track fairly closely as indicated in Figure 2. 
In Figure 5, we graph seeded area and summerfallow area along with May pond counts for the 
period 1955-2009. It is not clear that either seeded area or summerfallow explains pond counts. 
What about the role of agricultural subsidies, which became important beginning in the early 
1970s? A plot of agricultural subsidies and wetlands is provided in Figure 6. However, without 
conducting a regression analysis, it is not clear to what extent the factors in Figures 5 and 6 
impact wetlands. Upon regressing May ponds on seeded acreage, summerfallow area and the 
per cultivated hectare agricultural subsidy, we find that agricultural subsidies do indeed have a 
negative impact on wetlands, but that the other variables do not. The OLS regression result is as 
follows (with t-statistics in parentheses): 
Ponds = 7.45 – 0.12 Seeded – 0.14 Fallow – 0.01 Subsidy, R
2=0.08. 
              (2.57) (–1.18)            (–1.30)           (–1.88)   Page | 6 
 
 
Figure 4: Cropland Acreage and Duck Populations, 1955-2009 
Although the signs on the regressors have the expected signs, only the subsidy variable is 
statistically significant (at the 10% level); the problem is that very little of the variation in 
wetlands area is explained by agricultural programs or cropped area (seeded plus 
summerfallow area).  
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Figure 6: Agricultural Subsidy Level and Wetlands Area, 1955-2009  
As indicated in the section on bioeconomic modeling, climate factors are an important factor 
explaining wetlands area from one year to the next. These factors were ignored in the simple 
OLS regression provided above. One reason why climate is important relates to the measure 
used for wetlands, namely, May pond counts. While July ponds are likely more indicative of 
permanent wetlands, researchers have relied solely on May ponds because they provide a 
much better statistical explanation of duck populations than July ponds (see, e.g., van Kooten et 
al. 2011; Hammack and Brown 1974; Brown and Hammack 1973); this is also evident from 
Figure 2. Indeed, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the agency that tracks ponds, has altogether 
stopped using the July ponds measure. Nonetheless, many May ponds are temporary, found in 
low lying areas on fields, especially pasturelands, and are thus highly correlated with the timing 
of snow melt and spring precipitation – climate or weather factors.  
Weather factors vary considerably across the region, with much drier conditions experienced in 
the southwest corner of the region (strata 28, 29 and 33) than in the northeast (e.g., strata 34 
and 36). Annual and growing season precipitation increase along a line from southwest to 
northeast, while growing season length and growing degree days generally decline as one 
travels from south to north. These trends are not linear, however. Nonetheless, sub-region 
differences in the grain belt are important and need to be taken into account. Fewer wetlands 
are found in drier regions (e.g, strata 29 and 33), but agriculture also tends to be less intensive 
except where there is irrigation, which is the case especially in stratum 29. Because these 
differences in climate impact agricultural land use, it is important to take into account 
agricultural activities and agricultural rents in the analysis of wetlands and migratory waterfowl. 
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rents, and is calibrated on a regional basis in addition to the entire study area. Further, as 
discussed in the introduction, we rely on econometric analysis and regional and sub-regional 
land use models to investigate these issues in more detail. 
 
Figure 7: Strata of the Waterfowl Breeding Population and Habitat Survey (thick lines) and 
Census Consolidated Subdivision Boundaries of the Census of Agriculture (thin lines) 
Climate change is expected to result in substantially drier conditions and increased incidents of 
drought in Canada’s grain belt during the 21
st Century (Johnson et al. 2005). Indeed, regional 
climate models predict that temperatures could rise by 1.8
oC to 4
oC in the prairie pothole 
region (Johnson et al. 2010). A major casualty will again be North America’s duck factory – the 
pothole region of the southern Prairie Provinces. A drier climate will reduce the number of 
wetlands, which will have an adverse impact on agricultural ecosystems and the region’s ability 
to produce waterfowl, as is clearly demonstrated by the high correlation between wetlands and 
breeding duck populations seen in Figure 2.  
Wetlands are also impacted by policies that seek to mitigate climate change, particularly 
policies related to the enhanced production of biofuels. Such policies are like a subsidy but 
perhaps more insidious. While meant to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with 
climate change, they lead to an increase in food prices that, in turn, hurts the least well off in 
global society, the very people that mitigation of climate change seeks to protect. Yet, it turns 
out that such programs might even increase overall greenhouse gas emissions (Crutzen et al.   Page | 9 
2008), lead to deforestation and conversion of marginal lands to cropland (Searchinger et al. 
2008, 2009), and, in the prairie pothole region, result in the degradation of wetlands.  The 
impacts of both climate change and climate change policies on wetlands are investigated in 
sections 2 and 3.  
Surprisingly, waterfowl management models have tended to focus on the hunting benefits of 
waterfowl, with wetlands often considered extraneous to the determination of hunting season 
length and bag limits – the tools of waterfowl management. Recognizing that the majority of 
hunters are located in the United States while the preponderance of breeding habitat is in 
Canada, the 1986 North American Waterfowl Management Plan (NAWMP) (U.S. Department of 
Interior and Environment Canada 1986) was implemented as a mechanism by which the U.S. 
could compensate Canadian landowners for the positive externality that greater numbers of 
ponds in Canada provided U.S. hunters.
1
A variety of wetland conservation activities have been undertaken by public and private 
agencies since the 1890s (Porter and van Kooten 1993), but the establishment of the North 
American Waterfowl Management Plan in 1986 constituted the first continental effort to 
restore waterfowl populations – to levels seen in the mid 1970s (CWS 2004). Since its inception, 
over $1.5 billion has been used in conservation efforts across Canada with more than half of 
these funds directed to the prairies (NAWMP Committee 2009). In the PPR where the overlap 
between the best waterfowl habitat and the best agricultural lands can be as high as 91 percent 
(Bethke and Nudds 1995), it is not surprising that the primary conservation strategy is land 
securement: “The protection of wetland and/or upland habitat through land title transfer or 
binding long-term (minimum 10-year) conservation agreements with a landowner” (NAWMP 
Committee 2009). To date, over six million acres have been secured and an additional two 
million acres targeted over the next 10 years (NAWMP Committee 2009).  
 However, NAWMP was criticized for, among other 
things, simply offsetting the negative impacts of extant Canadian agricultural subsidies (van 
Kooten 1993b). 
2. Bioeconomic Modeling of Wetlands Conservation 
In this section, we examine bioeconomic models of wetlands conservation. Gardner Brown and 
Judd Hammack (1973), hereafter B&H, were the first to use a mathematical bioeconomic 
                                                      
1 The focus of NAWMP was not only on provision of ponds. The program provided payments to farmers 
for providing dense nesting cover on lands that would otherwise be cropped, thereby enhancing the 
ability of waterfowl to reproduce. Ideally sites are to be fenced to keep out predators, but payments are 
usually inadequate. See van Kooten and Schmitz (1992) and van Kooten (1993a, 1993b) for a more 
detailed discussion of these issues.   Page | 10 
modeling approach (Clark 1976) to address waterfowl dynamics and wetlands conservation.
2
2.1 An Extended Bioeconomic Model of Duck Hunting 
 
Such models optimize an economic objective function subject to dynamic technical, biological, 
socioeconomic and political constraints. B&H (1973) and H&B (1974) chose a model that could 
be solved analytically to provide insights, but they needed to solve it numerically to determine 
whether the optimal policy called for more or less wetlands. In their specification, they focused 
exclusively on duck hunting values, ignoring other waterfowl values and wetland benefits. We 
begin with a variant of the H&B model, and then expand it, firstly, to include the viewing value 
of waterfowl and, importantly, the ecological service and other amenity values of wetlands. We 
then expand the model to include the impact of climate change. 
B&H (1973) and Brown et al. (1976) specify a discrete bioeconomic optimal control model of 
duck hunting. They postulate a social planner whose objective is to maximize benefits to 
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where v(ht, yt, Zt) is a function describing the annual benefits derived from duck hunting, which 
is a function of the number of ducks harvested (h), per capita income of duck hunters (y), and 
such things as age, gender and outdoor experience that characterize duck hunters (Z); C(Wt) is 
the annual cost of providing W amount of wetlands (measured by the number of ponds); and ρ 
= 1/(1+r) is the discount factor with r the discount rate used by the hypothetical planner. The 
length of the planning horizon is T, and could possibly be infinite. In the H&B model, harvest 
levels and the number of ponds are decision variables.
3
H&B’s objective function (1) can be extended by bringing in two types of amenity values – one 
is related to the nonmarket (non-use) benefits of waterfowl, while the other takes into account 
the ecosystem service and non-use values of wetlands themselves. The modified objective 
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2 Judd Hammack’s PhD dissertation on the subject was subsequently published as a book (Hammack and 
Brown 1974). Details pertaining to data, estimation of the value of ducks to hunters, and the 
bioeconomic model are found therein. 
3 H&B multiply v(.) by the number of hunters, the control variable if bag limits and average take per 
hunter are constant. Here v(.) is simply the benefit to all hunters.    Page | 11 
where  Dt  refers to the population of May breeding ducks in year t,  while  α  is the annual 
amenity value of a duck, which could be positive for small numbers of ducks and negative for 
large numbers (e.g., if large numbers lead to crop depredation). To keep things simple, we 
assume the amenity value is a positive constant. B(Wt) is a wetlands ecosystem benefit function 
with ∂B/∂Wt > 0 and ∂
2B/∂Wt
2 ≤ 0.  
Ducks breed in the prairie pothole region in May and begin the fall flight south in September, 
which is also the start of hunting season. The fall flight consists of the fraction  s1  of May 
breeding ducks (Dt) that survive to September, plus their offspring that also survive to 
September. The latter is given by the recruitment (production) function g(Dt,  Wt), where 
∂g/∂Dt>0, ∂
2g/∂Dt
2≤0,  ∂g/∂Wt>0, ∂
2g/∂Wt
2≤0.  Equation  (2)  is  maximized subject to the 
following bioeconomic constraints:  
Dt+1 = s2 [s1 Dt + g(Dt, Wt) – π ht],  (3) 
Dt, ht, Wt ≥ 0; and D0 > 0, W0 > 0 given  (4) 
where Dt+1 is the number of mature ducks returning to the prairie pothole breeding grounds in 
year t+1, s1 is the fraction of May breeders surviving to September, s2 is the fraction of mature 
ducks that are not killed by hunters and survive to return to the breeding grounds in year t+1, 
and π > 1 accounts for the loss of ducks that are killed or maimed by hunters but not collected 
or reported. Conditions (4) are non-negativity requirements and initial conditions regarding the 
numbers of ducks and ponds. 
Applying Bellman’s principle of optimality leads to the following recurrence relation known as 
Bellman’s equation (Léonard and van Long 1992, pp.174-176):  
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where Vt is a value function and λt = ∂Vt/∂Dt is the shadow price of an additional duck. Equation 
(5) can be solved using backward recursion based on the assumption that the social planner or 
authority behaves optimally in the future so that the value at time t+1, Vt+1, is the best one can 
do.
4
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions are: 
 The first-order conditions are found by first setting ∂Vt/∂ht = 0 and ∂Vt/∂Wt = 0, and then 
differentiating both sides of (5) by the state variables Dt (recalling that Dt+1 is a function of Dt).  
                                                      
4 The backward recursive approach of dynamic programming best lends itself to numerical solutions. In 
that case, T must be finite and the value VT(DT) must be specified.    Page | 12 
∂Vt/∂ht = ∂v/∂ht – ρ λt+1 s2 π = 0  (6) 
∂Vt/∂Wt = B′(Wt) – c + ρ λt+1 s2 ∂g/∂Wt = 0  (7) 
∂Vt/∂Dt = λt = α + ρ λt+1 s2 (s1 + ∂g/∂Dt)   (8) 
where c = dC/dWt is the annual opportunity cost of providing an additional pond.
5 Additionally, 
the state equation (3) must be satisfied; the sufficient conditions for a maximum are 
guaranteed by Bellman’s optimality principle with limt→∞ λt ρ
t Dt = 0.
6
From maximum principle (6), we find that (1/π) ∂v/∂ht = ρ λt+1 s2, which says that hunting 
should continue until the value of the marginal duck that is harvested (adjusted for the fact that 
not all birds killed are recovered) equals the user cost of taking that bird (which equals its 
discounted shadow value adjusted for the fact that not all unharvested ducks survive to breed 
the following spring). Similarly, from maximum principle (7), we find: c = B′(Wt) + ρ λt+1 s2 
∂g/∂Wt. The left-hand side of this expression is the current cost of an additional pond, which is 
simply the cost of establishing or protecting it. The right-hand side is the marginal benefit of an 
additional pond, which consists of the sum of two terms. The first term constitutes the current 
marginal ecosystem service and other amenity values of the pond, B′(Wt). This term is absent 
from the H&B model as they do not consider nonmarket values of wetlands. The second term is 
the marginal value of an additional wetland in the production of ducks that return to the 
breeding ground next year. Note that the shadow value of next year’s duck is adjusted by the 
discount factor ρ and the mortality risk. 
 Equations (6) and (7) 
constitute a maximum principle, while equation (8) is the co-state equation. 
The final condition (8) can best be interpreted by re-writing it as λt – α = ρλt+1 s2(s1+∂g/∂Dt). In 
the absence of the amenity term α, the discounted future (shadow) value of allowing a duck to 
escape (adjusted for mortality and the marginal growth in duck population) must equal the 
current (shadow) value of harvesting that duck, λt. From the perspective of the planner, 
however, the shadow value of the marginal duck to hunters needs to be reduced by α, because 
the planner needs to take into account the non-use value that a duck provides citizens. This is 
done by raising the population of waterfowl over that in the case where ducks only have value 
to hunters – the case considered by H&B. Compared to the hunters-only case, more ducks are 
allowed to escape to the next year to satisfy both the need to make more birds available to 
                                                      
5 The marginal cost of providing an additional pond need not be constant, but could be a function of the 
number of ponds, so that we would write c(Wt) = dC/dWt. 
6 Notice also that functions v(.) and g(.) are taken to be non changing over time. Further, the last 
condition says that either it is optimal to drive the duck population to zero at some future time or the 
present shadow value of an additional duck is zero.   Page | 13 
hunters in the future and the non-use value ducks provide.  
Substitute ρ λt+1 s2 from (6) and from (7) into (8) to get the following expressions for the current 
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Setting (9) equal to (10), and rearranging, gives a relationship similar to (7), but one that more 

















.  (11) 
The left-hand side of (11) is the (marginal) social cost of providing an additional pond, while the 
right-hand side is the value of the additional pond in the production of ducks for hunters plus 
the ecosystem service and non-use benefits it provides. 
A steady-state solution is found by letting λt+1=λt and Dt+1=Dt,  ∀t. We then find the following 



































2 2 1 , and  (13) 
(1 – s1s2)D = s2 g(D, W) – π h.  (14) 
Once functional forms and associated parameters are chosen, equations (12), (13) and (14) can 
be solved simultaneously for the optimal waterfowl population and optimal decisions 
concerning harvests and number of ponds that maximize the social planner’s wellbeing. To find 
the steady-state solutions if the non-use values of wetlands and ducks are ignored, the terms 
B′(W) in equation (12) and α in (13) would need to be set to zero. This would provide optimal   Page | 14 
values of our variables in H&B’s case where the focus is solely on hunters’ benefits.  
2.2 Estimating Parameters for the Bioeconomic Waterfowl-Wetlands Model 
Hammack and Brown (1974) used information from a survey of duck hunters to estimate a 
demand function for duck hunting. No other such survey has been conducted in the intervening 
years. We employ the functional form for demand employed by B&H (1973). However, the 
parameters of B&H’s function are simply too unrealistic for our application nearly forty years 
later, even if these are adjusted for inflation. Therefore, we proceed as follows.  
In 2007, a total of 815,300 duck hunters in the Mississippi, Central and Pacific flyways spent an 
average of 7.2 days in the field and bagged 15.7 ducks; in 2008, 802,400 hunters harvested an 
average of 14.8 ducks and spent 7.1 days on the activity (Table 1).
7
Cortus et al. (2010) calculate the net benefits of wetland retention in Saskatchewan by adapting 
the gross public benefits of wetland retention from Belcher et al. (2001). Their ‘best estimate’ 
of public benefits of wetlands is $81.55 per hectare, while the low estimate is $39.62. We use 
the low value of wetlands benefits as our base case but conduct sensitivity analysis using the 
best estimate.  These values need to be converted to a per pond measure. Cowardin, Shaffer 
and Arnold (1995) find that 78% of wetlands in the northern U.S. Great Plains cover 0.41 ha or 
less. Assuming an exponential distribution, we calculate the average pond to have an area of 
0.27 ha.
 Using 1972-2008 data for 
Alberta, harvests averaged 12.8 ducks per hunter annually. Based on 20 studies, Loomis (2000) 
finds an average value of a wilderness recreation day to be $39.61 in 1996 US dollars, or $53.83 
in 2008 after adjusting for inflation. Assuming duck hunters spend an average of 7 days in the 
field and harvest 14.5 birds, each bird is then worth approximately $26. Multiply this value by 
an average harvest of 12.3 million ducks over 2007 and 2008 in the Mississippi, Central and 
Pacific flyways gives a total benefit of $319.8 million. Assuming that the parameter value on 
harvest is 0.6, we calculate v(h) = 70.947 h
 0.6, with v(h) and h measured in millions. 
8
The annual cost of restoring a pond is given by the (marginal) opportunity cost of retaining the 
wetland plus the annualized cost of restoring it. The net opportunity costs of protecting or 
restoring wetlands equals the reduction in the value of cultivated land or land in its best 
alternative use. In cases where flooding is common, or where wetlands are permanent, the cost 
 Then the base case value is $10.69 per pond and the higher estimate for sensitivity 
purposes is $22.01 per pond. For simplicity, it is simply assumed, for simulation purposes, that 
marginal benefits are constant at $10 and $22 per pond. 
                                                      
7 We focus on U.S. hunters because the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (2010) contribute to the collection 
of data in Canada and the U.S. contributes to wetlands protection in Canada under NAWMP. 
8 The cumulative probability function is: Prob(x<X) = 1 – e
–3.693  x. H&B (1974, p.69) indicate that the 
average size of a pond in the Prairie pothole region was determined to be 0.85 acres or 0.34 hectares.    Page | 15 
might be zero. Since the least number of ponds in the PPR during the period 1955-2009 was 
rarely below two million and then only in drought years, we assume this amount of wetlands 
can be protected at no cost, and that no restoration is required for anything less than two 
million ponds.  
Net returns to agricultural land vary considerably from year to year, from one crop to another, 
and across the prairie pothole region. This is considered in the extend model that includes 
climate variables. To derive the net opportunity costs of retaining wetlands in the PPR, Cortus 
et al. (2010) use a farm level simulation model. They determine the cost of retaining wetlands 
to be between $28 and $41 per hectare, or between $8 and $11 per pond.  
The marginal cost of protecting any pond beyond two million ponds is also assumed to be 
constant. We calculate one-time restoration costs to be between $360 and $1300 per pond, 
which we convert to annualized restoration cost of $12 to $44 per pond assuming the authority 
purchases a 30-year easement on the property containing the wetland (see Hansen 2009).  
Summing the annualized restoration cost and annual opportunity costs, we find that costs 
range broadly from $20 to $55 per pond. We use a conservative approach and assume the 
overall annual net (marginal opportunity) cost of keeping a wetland is $55 per pond, although 
we employ sensitivity analysis with costs ranging from $35 to $65.  
B&H (1973), H&B (1974) and Brown et al. (1976) use two functional forms for the waterfowl 
production function –  a double-logarithmic form (or Cobb-Douglas) and a Beverton-Holt 
production function. As the number of breeding ducks grows to infinity, the number of 
offspring grows indefinitely large in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function, but is 
bounded by the available habitat (the ecosystem carrying capacity) in the case of the Beverton-
Holt model. Because our estimated double-logarithmic production function exhibited increasing 
returns to scale, we find that increases in the costs of restoring wetlands are offset in the 
steady state by unbounded increases in optimal breeding populations, an unrealistic result. We 
also found that, with the Beverton-Holt production function, the dynamic model turns out to be 
highly unstable, which is not unusual in this case as noted by van Kooten and Bulte (2000, 
p.184).  Indeed, the required properties of the waterfowl production function are better 
modeled using the following  standard logistic growth function now commonly used in 
bioeconomic models:  















D 1 γ   (15) 
where γ is the intrinsic growth rate and g
b
t W is the carrying capacity of the prairie pothole   Page | 16 
ecosystem (where g and b are parameters to be estimated). As indicated in the next subsection, 
this functional form also permits us to more easily introduce climate variables. 
We have data on breeding ducks and immature offspring, and on wetlands (May pond counts), 
for the prairie pothole region of southern Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, namely, the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (2010a) strata 26 through 40, over the period 1955 to 2009. We 
also have data on July ponds for the period 1955-2003, U.S. duck harvests for the Central flyway 
for the period 1961-2008, and Canadian harvests of ducks for the period 1969-2008. We use 
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2 = 0.50  (16) 
                 (8.73)        (4.20) (4.25) 
Finally, we employ H&B’s (1974, p.50) values for intra-year survival rates for the period 
between breeding in May and the start of hunting season in September (s1) and the period 
after hunting season until breeding begins (s2). Brown et al. (1976) assume 5% of duck kills are 
not reported, and we use this factor to account for underreporting of bird kills by hunters. 
Loomis and White (1996) report non-use values for several endangered bird species, which are 
quite large for some species such as Whooping Crane. Ducks and geese tend to be plentiful, so 
their value to bird watchers and other viewers tends to be smaller. Therefore, we use a very 
low value for the amenity value of ducks. This value is lower than the values of endangered bird 
species reported by Loomis and White.  
2.3 Socially Desirable versus Historical Wetlands Area and Waterfowl Populations 
We determine the steady-state solutions by solving the system of equations (12), (13) and (14) 
for the case where non-use values are not taken into account (only hunter values are 
considered), and the steady-state solutions when non-use values of wetlands and ducks are 
included. A summary of the results in provided in Table 1, which gives the optimal steady-state 
values of ducks, harvests and wetlands.  
When non-market amenity values are not taken into account, we have the situation examined 
by B&H (1973), H&B (1974) and Brown et al. (1974). When using a cost of wetlands of $45 per 
pond or lower, we confirm their findings, despite using different functional forms and updated 
information on duck populations and wetlands: for the most part, wetlands and duck harvests 
(and thus duck populations) are below socially desirable levels.  
                                                      
9 The t-statistics are in parenthesis below the expression in which the estimated coefficient is found and 
are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors.    Page | 17 
Table 1: Historic and Steady State Values of Ponds, Ducks and 
Harvests, Various Net Costs of Wetlands Restoration (millions) 
 Item  Ponds (W)  Ducks (D)  Harvests (h) 
Historic values
a  3.5  13.5  12.3 
  Base Case   
No amenity value  2.6  12.8  12.6 
Amenity value  4.1  20.3  19.6 
  Cost=$45; B′(W)=$10
b 
No Amenity value  3.5  17.0  16.8 
Amenity value  6.3  30.6  29.0 
  Cost=$35; B′(W)=$10
b 
No amenity value  5.2  24.4  24.1 
Amenity value  11.6  54.3  50.0 
  Cost=$65; B′(W)=$10
b 
No amenity value  1.96  9.9  10.0 
Amenity value  2.9  14.8  14.3 
Notes: 
a Ponds and ducks are for Canada’s prairie region and based on the average of 1955-2008 data 
from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (2010a), while harvest is the average of 2007-2008 U.S. 
harvest for the Pacific, Mississippi and Central flyways (average total U.S. duck harvest was 14.1 
million). There exists a mismatch in terms of the regions used for reporting of ponds versus 
waterfowl population data and harvest data. 
b Cost refers to net annualized costs of restoring a pond plus the annual opportunity cost, while 
B′(W) is the nonmarket (ecosystem service plus other amenity) benefit of an additional pond. 
Source: van Kooten et al. (2011) 
 
The matter is only made worse when the ecosystem amenity values of wetlands and the 
viewing value of waterfowl are taken into account. In that case, the socially optimal level of 
wetlands increases – increasing the marginal benefit of a pond should increase the number of 
ponds, which in turns leads to an increase in ducks and harvests as a result of increased 
breeding habitat. Then, increasing the value of waterfowl to viewers  (parameter  α) will 
decrease the shadow value of the marginal duck to hunters, indicating that the planner needs 
to raise the population of waterfowl over that in the model where ducks only had value to 
hunters. The base case results in Table 1 indicate that wetlands should be about 17 percent 
higher, which is consistent with H&B, while the duck population and harvests should be about 
50% and 60% higher than historic levels, respectively (Table 1). 
In addition to the actual values obtained in Table 1, ratios of ducks per pond and harvests per 
pond can easily be calculated. For May pond data, the historical levels are 3.85 ducks and 3.54 
harvests per pond. In the current model under the base case ‘amenity value’ scenario, the   Page | 18 
optimal levels of ducks and harvests to ponds are 4.98 and 4.79, respectively. Thus, given the 
number of wetlands, historic levels of both waterfowl and harvests are too low from a social 
planner’s perspective. This result could be an artifact of the logistics growth model, but it could 
also be that more should be done to provide dense nesting cover for breeding waterfowl, 
thereby increasing wetlands productivity.  
Our estimate of $55/pond as the net annual cost of restoring and retaining wetlands might be 
considered conservative, and, from our review of the literature, it is quite possible that the net 
costs of conserving ponds could be lower. However, using lower values only reinforces the 
result that current wetlands protection levels do not appear to be adequate. Indeed, if the 
annual cost of restoring and retaining wetlands is $35/pond rather than $55 per pond, the 
number of ponds to protect rises from an historic level of 3.5 million to over 10 million.  
2.4 Climate Impacts on Wetlands and Waterfowl Populations 
Using temperature, precipitation and  drought data for various locations across Western 
Canada's grain belt, Withey and van Kooten (2011a) estimated the following relationships using 
ordinary least squares: 
Wt = 2.90 + 3.33 SPIt–1, R
2=0.30, S.E=0.95  (17) 
      (26.28) (4.84) 
Wt = 3.138 + 0.085 Pt–1 – 0.310 Tt–1,  R
2=0.36, S.E=0.91,  (18) 
       (1.83)     (4.07)         (-2.83) 
where t-statistics are provided in parentheses, W is measured in millions of May ponds, SPI is 
the standardized precipitation index (a common drought measure), P  is precipitation (in 
millimeters), and T is temperature (in degrees Celsius). 
The authors then considered the following climate scenarios:  
(i)  an increase in temperature of 3
oC, no change in precipitation; 
(ii) no increase in temperature, a decrease in precipitation of 20%; 
(iii) an increase in temperature of 3
oC, a decrease in precipitation of 20%; and 
(iv)   an increase in temperature of 3
oC, an increase in precipitation of 20%. 
For specification (17), the corresponding global warming induced changes in SPI due to the four 
alternative changes in temperature and precipitation were first estimated, and then the effects   Page | 19 
of SPI on wetlands were found using the estimated regression coefficient on SPIt–1. For 
specification (18), the effect of climate change on wetlands was found using the estimated 
coefficients on Pt–1 (precipitation) and Tt–1 (temperature) for the four precipitation-temperature 
scenarios identified above. The projected values of W under climate change are provided in 
Table 2, and inserted into the waterfowl population dynamics equation (16). 
Table 2: Effect of Climate Change on Wetlands in the Absence of Wetlands Protection 
Policies: Percent Decrease in Wetlands Area 














(17)  20  13  34  7 
(18)  27  19  47  10 
Source: Withey and van Kooten (2011a) 
 
Subsequently, the associated bioeconomic model was solved for each of the four climate 
scenarios and two regression models. The results are provided in Table 3. With climate change, 
there are significant decreases in the optimal amounts of wetlands that society should retain. 
The reduction in wetlands ranges from 5% to 38% compared to the base case, no climate 
change scenario. Further, the proportional decline in ducks and harvests is significantly greater 
than the fall in wetlands. Because there are fewer wetlands, the model also projects a decrease 
in the ratio of ducks and harvests to wetlands. Clearly, with substantially fewer wetlands, the 
landscape cannot support the large duck populations that it currently does because, with 
climate change, the socially optimal levels of ducks and harvests are much smaller. These 
results illustrate the potentially severe effects of climate change on wetlands and migratory 
waterfowl in North America’s duck factory.  
Table 3: Optimal Values of May Ponds, Duck Populations and Duck Harvests (millions): 
Historic and Model Base Case and Climate Change Scenarios 
Regression    Base  Scenario i    Scenario ii    Scenario iii    Scenario iv 
Model →  Historic  case  (17)  (18)    (17)  (18)    (17)  (18)    (17)  (18) 
Ponds  3.5  4.1  3.4  3.2    3.7  3.5    3.0  2.6    3.9  3.8 
Ducks   13.5  20.3  13.8  11.8    15.9  14.1    9.9  6.9    17.9  16.9 
Harvests  12.4  19.6  13.4  11.5    15.4  13.7    9.7  6.8    17.3  16.4 
Source: Adapted from Withey and van Kooten (2011a).  
 
3. Regional Impacts 
Wetlands are not evenly distributed across western Canada’s southern Prairie Provinces. The 
eastern and northern regions receive more precipitation, while southern regions are warmer 
earlier. These factors determine the abundance of wetlands and their productivity. Given that   Page | 20 
the climate varies across the prairies, climate change will also have varying impacts. In this 
section, therefore, we consider how climate change affects various regions and impacts 
wetlands and their management. We do this by first solving the preceding bioeconomic model 
at the level of individual strata. We then examine how, at the margin, restoration or 
degradation of wetlands has a direct and an indirect effect on waterfowl populations. The 
direct effect is due to the gain (loss) of waterfowl resulting from the restoration (degradation) 
of the particular wetland. The indirect effect takes into account what happens in other regions. 
A panel data set that takes into account spatial aspects is employed to investigate this 
particular aspect. Finally, rather than a bioeconomic model as in the earlier research, we 
develop a region-specific land use model, calibrated using positive mathematical programming, 
to examine the impact of climate change on land use, including land in wetlands. Importantly, 
the model is also used to investigate the impact that biofuel policies designed to mitigate global 
warming will have on land use in the PPR. 
3.1 Bioeconomic Modeling of Land Use at the Regional Level: The Impact of Climate Change 
The bioeconomic model described in section 2 can be modified so that the social planner, or 
the authority, makes decisions regarding land use as well as decisions regarding levels of duck 
harvests and wetlands retention/restoration. In this case, the objective function (2) is rewritten 
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where N(at) is the net return to cropland at ($/acre), and the other variables in the above 
function are as defined previously. Cropland excludes waterfowl habitat but takes into account 
land in summerfallow, crops or pasture. By including cropland in this model, we are able to 
estimate the effect of land use changes due to policies designed to mitigate climate change.   
Withey and van Kooten (2011b) add the following state equation and land constraint to the 
bioeconomic model described above: 
Wt+1 = β0+ β1 Wt e
SPIt  (20) 
A = Wt + at   (21) 
Because we lack data, we let  C ′(Wt) = c,  which is  a constant  equal to the annual cost of 
providing an additional pond, and dN/dat = N′(at) is the marginal net revenue from cropping the 
next acre taken out of wetlands. The bioeconomic model is solved in the same fashion as 
before, with the addition of constraints (20) and (21). That is, objective (19) is maximized   Page | 21 
subject to constraints (3), (4), (20) and (21), and solved as an augmented Lagrangian function.
10
Historic and model-determined steady-state values of wetlands area, duck populations and 
harvests, and area cropped are provided in Table 4. The socially optimal steady-state values of 
the four outcome variables in the model are for the case where no climate change is postulated 
to take place. Based on model derived shadow prices, Withey and van Kooten (2011b) find that 
an additional duck is worth about $9 (not shown in Table 4), while an additional acre of 
wetlands is worth about $50, with the value of marginal wetlands 28% higher in Saskatchewan 
than the regional average but worth 42% less in Manitoba (Table 4). Strata level details are 
available in Withey and van Kooten (2011b). 
 
In this case, however, there are two control variables – duck harvests (h) and area cropped (a) – 
rather than only harvests. Parameter values for this model are similar to those used above; only 
net revenues from cropping and the state equation (20) have been added. Further details are 
available by Withey and van Kooten (2011b). 
Table 4: Historic and No Climate Change Steady-State Values of Wetlands Area, 
Duck Populations, Duck Harvests and Cropped Area, by Province and Prairie 
Pothole Region Total (millions) 
  Province   
Item  Alberta  Saskatchewan  Manitoba  TOTAL 
Historic Values       
Wetlands (acres)  0.64  1.72  0.59  2.95 
Duck populations  4.30  7.50  1.30  13.1 
Duck harvests   ––  ––  ––  12.30 
Cropped area (acres)  21.4  48.10  11.1  80.60 
Wetland shadow value   ––  ––  ––  –– 
Base Case Optimal Values       
Wetlands (acres)  0.62  1.62  0.56  2.8 
Duck populations  4.48  12.1  2.26  18.84 
Duck harvests   4.48  10.43  2.24  17.15 
Cropped area (acres)  21.42  48.2  11.13  80.75 
Wetland shadow value ($/ac)  56.8  63.6  28.8  49.7 
 
How do climate change and, importantly, biofuel policies to mitigate climate change affect the 
above results? To answer this question, Withey and van Kooten (2011b) first assumed that 
climate change would increase temperatures throughout the PPR by 3
oC, and decrease 
precipitation by 10%. They then assumed that  the renewable fuel standard for diesel that 
                                                      
10 The augmented Lagrangian function constitutes the Hamiltonian plus the static constraint (21) that 
must hold in every period (see Léonard and van Long 1992, pp.192-194).   Page | 22 
increases energy crop production (a policy for mitigating climate change) would increase the 
price of canola by 15%. They estimated that this would increase land in crops by 1.25 million; 
this increase in cropland was assumed to come from wetlands. The renewable fuel standard is 
combined with the climate change scenario. The model was then used to estimate the impacts 
of the no-climate change, climate change, and climate change plus renewable fuel standard 
scenarios at the regional, provincial and strata levels. Summary results are provided in Table 5 
with greater detail found in Withey and van Kooten (2011b).  
Table 5: The Effect of Climate Change and Climate Change Policies on the Socially Optimal 
Levels of Wetlands, Duck Populations and Harvests, and Cropped Area for Different Levels of 
Regional Analysis 

















a  2.95  13.1  12.3  88.5 
Base-case Optimization
b       
Entire pothole region  2.79  16.79  15.23  80.75 
Province level  2.81  18.84  17.22  80.74 
Stratum level  2.78  27.43  22.34  80.77 
Climate change impacts
c       
Entire pothole region  2.47  14.99  13.65  81.07 
Province level  2.51  16.81  15.48  81.04 
Stratum level  2.54  25.02  20.55  81.01 
Climate change plus renewable fuel standard
d     
Entire pothole region  1.23  7.78  7.22  82.31 
Province level  1.26  8.43  7.99  82.29 
Stratum level  1.29  13.52  11.23  82.26 
a Ponds and ducks are for Canada’s prairie region, based on US Fish and Wildlife Service 
(http://mbdcapps.fws.gov/) average of 1955-2008 data; harvests are average 2007-2008 US harvest 
(www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/NewReportsPublications/HIP/hip.htm). 
b Based on solution to bioeconomic model accounting for the amenity values of wetlands and ducks. 
c Optimization based on an increase in temperature of 3
oC and a decrease in precipitation of 20%. 
d Optimization based on climate change and increase in acreage planted to energy crops. 
Source: Withey and van Kooten (2011b) 
Under assumed climate change, optimal wetlands retention declines from 2.79 million to 2.47 
million acres, which represents a decline of 12%. The optimal duck population falls by nearly 
11% and harvests by 10%. Yet, even under climate change that negatively impacts wetlands, 
socially desirable duck populations and duck harvests are above historic (and current) levels. 
However, the impacts reported here are smaller than those found in the previous section, 
mainly as a result of modeling differences (especially the use of a nonlinear relation between   Page | 23 
wetlands and climate).  
The optimal level of aggregate  wetlands to retain when both climate change and the 
implementation of a renewable fuel standard are assumed is 1.23 million acres, a reduction of 
56% from baseline. This greatly exceeds the decline in wetlands attributable to project climate 
change alone. It appears that climate mitigation policies that increase the value of agricultural 
land in crop production, in this case canola for production of bio-diesel, have a greater adverse 
environmental impact on wetlands and waterfowl than the threat of global warming.  
The results of the analysis are similar, whether the analysis is conducted at the supra-regional 
(PPR) level, provincial levels and aggregated, or strata levels and aggregated (Table 5). Although 
not reported here, the climate change impacts on wetlands in the PPR are driven primarily by 
large  reductions in Saskatchewan, although proportional declines in wetlands area are 
projected to be greatest for Alberta and least for Manitoba (in both level and proportional 
terms). At the strata level, the reduction in optimal wetlands retention is highest in strata 30-34 
located in Saskatchewan, and stratum 26 in northern Alberta. In Alberta it is optimal to drain all 
wetlands in stratum 29 (see Figures 3 and 7), while wetlands reductions are projected to be 
smallest in eastern parts of Saskatchewan (strata 35) and Manitoba. These results are similar to 
those reported in section 3.3 below, where an entirely different model is employed.  
3.2 Panel Data Model 
It is clear that agricultural land use changes have an impact on waterfowl abundance in the 
Canadian Prairie Pothole Region. What is not clear is the nature of this impact? For example, in 
extremely arid years, migratory waterfowl will continue their flight north, into the boreal zone if 
necessary, to find adequate breeding habitat. When wetlands are drained, migratory waterfowl 
will seek breeding habitat in other areas of the pothole region. It is necessary to consider spatial 
aspects if one really wants to know the extent to which degradation of waterfowl habitat 
reduces waterfowl population levels over the entire grain belt. This requires the examination of 
wetlands, waterfowl and agricultural data across the region. It requires a model that takes into 
account what happens in various sub-regions simultaneously. It requires a model that takes into 
account spatial autocorrelation.  
In order to examine the impacts of wetlands degradation across the study region, Wong et al. 
(2011) treated information from each of the strata in Figure 7 over the period 1955-2008 as a 
panel.  Agricultural Census data for the Census subdivisions in Figure 7 were aggregated to the 
strata level. Then, using a standard static panel model, Wong et al. (2011) found that a one 
percent increase in the proportion of land in a region that is cropped led to a predicted 6% 
reduction in the density of duck populations. For similar proportional reductions in 
summerfallow and pasture acreage, the respective declines in duck density were found to be   Page | 24 
7% and 6%. Estimates from models that used a dynamic rather than a static specification were 
more conservative, however. For the lagged dependent variable model, a one percentage point 
increase in cropland was predicted to decrease duck density by 4.6%. For summerfallow and 
pasture, the predicted decreases were 4.7% and 4.6%, respectively.  
Spatial autoregressive models allow the derivation of measures for assessing direct and indirect 
impacts. The researchers found that the estimated direct impacts projected by a model that 
took into account spatial autocorrelation fell between the estimates obtained from the 
standard and dynamic models. However, when spillover effects were also included, the 
estimated impacts exceed those predicted by the standard (static) model.  
The Wong et al. results suggest that, when wetlands are lost at one location, ducks do not 
compensate by breeding in other locations, or, if they do, that there is an overall reduction in 
fecundity. This makes programs to retain or  create wetlands all the more worthwhile as 
additional wetlands in one location will result in enhanced productivity of ducks in another. It 
would appear that there are economies of scale for ducks in wetlands provision. 
Because geographically referenced data are available, it is logical to use a spatial model. In this 
particular case, the bias resulting from not explicitly modeling spatial dependencies may not be 
practically significant, but neglecting possible indirect impacts only gives researchers a partial 
picture of how agricultural land use changes affect waterfowl populations. For example, one 
spatial model reported by Wong et al. estimated that the direct impact of a one percent 
increase in cropland would result in a 5% decline in duck density for a typical stratum, although 
the total impact is much larger (9%) because land use changes in one region not only affect the 
waterfowl population for that stratum, but also impact populations in surrounding regions. 
Thus, both standard and dynamic panel models yield downward biased estimators. 
Wong et al. (2011) used the statistical results to provide an assessment of the efficacy of 
wetlands conservation programs. The North American Waterfowl Management Plan spent 
some $1.2 billion during 1986-2008 to secure 25,500 km
2 of land in the Canadian PPR. This 
implied that an average of 1,100 km
2 of farmland was secured annually at a cost of $52 million. 
In 2006, 1,100 km
2 constituted 0.25% of farm area and waterfowl density was roughly 30 ducks 
per square km. The conservation dollars spent securing habitat to increase the waterfowl 
population by a single duck can be estimated using these figures and the results from the 
regression models. These calculations are presented in Table 6. Assuming that the 1,100 km
2 of 
secured land came entirely from cropland, it costs somewhere between $107 and $262 to 
protect a marginal duck. However, these estimates are on the high side because it is less costly 
to secure land for wetlands if it is taken from summerfallow or pasture.   Page | 25 








Spatial lag model 
with de-meaned 
data 





Δ Duck Density  +0.44  +0.35  +0.67  +0.85 
 
Δ Ducks in PPR  254,438  198,375  385,538  486,881 
 
Expenditure per  
Duck  $204  $262  $135  $107 
         
Notes:  
Source: Wong et al. (2011) 
The Canadian Prairie Pothole Region is roughly 575,000 km
2. 
 
In summary, the analysis by Wong et al. (2011) indicates that, when determining the benefits of 
conserving wetlands, biologists need to look beyond the impact of wetlands restoration (or 
degradation) on local duck numbers only. They need to measure population increases in 
neighboring strata as well. By considering these indirect or spillover impacts of wetlands 
protection, the costs of preventing declines in waterfowl numbers or enhancing populations are 
also lower. 
3.3 Regional Effects of Climate Change on Land Use: An Application of Positive Mathematical 
Programming 
Withey and van Kooten (2011c) employ a multi-regional land use model that facilitates the 
explicit examination of tradeoffs between agricultural production and wetlands management. 
Positive mathematical programming (PMP) (Howitt 1995) is used to calibrate a land-use model 
to observed land uses in the study region. The calibrated model is then used to examine the 
impact of various climate change policies, which is done by varying the relevant model 
parameters. Observed data on average yields and land uses, along with the shadow values from 
the PMP calibration constraints, are used to estimate nonlinear yield functions for different 
agricultural land uses. Separate models for each of strata 26-40 employed by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service Population Survey (Figure 3) are calibrated to land use in 2006. In addition to 
wetlands, eight land-related activities were identified: spring wheat, winter wheat, barley, oats, 
peas, canola, tame pasture and hay land. For wetlands, data are lacking on net returns (yields, 
prices and production costs), so the model relies on private returns (wetlands represent a cost)   Page | 26 
plus public returns (positive social benefits). Given base case results, the impact of climate 
change is estimated by incorporating the climate-induced expected change in crop yields. In 
addition, the impact of one climate change mitigation policy affecting agricultural land use is 
examined, namely, policies to increase energy crops for biofuel. This is modeled by increasing 
the net returns to canola production. 
Positive Mathematical Programming Model of Land Use 
The PMP method is implemented in three stages. The first involves maximizing net returns to 
land uses subject to resource and calibration constraints. The linear program (LP) is as follows: 
Max  i i i i x c y p ∑ − ) (   (22) 
s.t.     j R x a
i
j i ij ∀ ≤ ∑ ,   (23) 
i i i x x ε + ≤
0   (24) 
where pi, yi and ci are the prices, yields and average costs for each of land uses i, the allocation 
of land to activity i is denoted xi; aij are the technical coefficients of production (the amount of 
resource j required per unit of xi); and  j R  is the total amount of resource j that is is total land 
available. Much like the Canadian Regional Agriculture Model (CRAM), we consider only the 




 Constraints (24) constitute the calibration constraints 
needed to implement PMP, with   the observed acreage in each land use and ε a perturbation 
term that is chosen to be a very small positive number. The model is solved for each of the 15 
strata and the nine land uses.  
Dual values from the LP described by (22), (23) and (24) are then used in the second stage of 
the PMP calibration to estimate the parameters of a nonlinear yield function. Assuming a 
quadratic yield function, yi = (βi – γi xi) xi, Howitt (1995) shows that the dual value on the 
calibration constraints, λ2
 in equation (23), are equal to the difference between the value of the 
average and marginal products of land. Thus, γi and βi are derived as follows:  




   (26) 
                                                      
11 Unlike the current application, the CRAM model considers a water resource constraint in addition to 
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βi  = yi – γi xi  (27) 
Given the dual values for each calibrated land use (λ2 ), as well as data on p, y and x, we can 
calibrate nonlinear yield functions that represent the decisions of landowners in a given region.  
The perturbation coefficient on the right hand side of equation (24) forces the LP to produce 
dual values that are then used to parameterize the yield function. However, since the number 
of constraints exceeds the number of activities, one of the calibration dual values will be zero. 
This least profitable activity is considered a marginal crop, where the calibration constraint does 
not bind and the activity is constrained only by the land use dual value from equation (23). In 
such a case, one cannot tell the difference between average and marginal product of land, and 
additional information is required to calibrate the yield function for this crop. In particular, the 
dual value on the resource constraint (23) is adjusted with expected yield variation from the 
mean to estimate the dual value on the calibration constraint for this land use ( 2 λ ). All λ2 
values must be adjusted by 2 λ .  
Finally, in the third step, the PMP problem becomes 
Max ∑ − − i i i i i i x c x p ) ) ( ( γ β   (28) 
s.t    j R x a
i
j i ij ∀ ≤ ∑ ,   (29) 
This model uses the calibrated yield function from the second stage to represent the 
landowners' decisions. Using only the resource constraint (29), the solution replicates the 
observed allocation for a base year. For different scenarios, only the parameters in (28) need to 
be adjusted.   
Three scenarios are examined. First, the direct climate change impacts on land use in the study 
region are modeled via the impact of climate on crop yields. By changing yields, one changes 
the value of crops relative to wetlands and thereby the amount of land optimally allocated to 
wetlands. A regression model used to estimate the impact of annual precipitation and average 
maximum temperature on average crop yields for each crop in each stratum is as follows: 
yir= θ0 + θ1 Pr + θ2 Tr + εir,  (30) 
where yir is observed average yield for crop i in region r; Pr and Tr are the precipitation and 
temperature, respectively, affecting region r; θs are parameters to be estimated; and ε is the 
error term. Given the estimated θs and an expected future climate scenario, one can estimate   Page | 28 
the change in yields from historical averages brought about by the changed climate. For 
scenario #1 estimates of the impact on yields are based on an increase in temperature of 3
oC 
and a decrease in precipitation of 10% (see section 2.4 above).  
Second, although climate change affects crop yields and thereby wetlands, a warmer and drier 
climate also leads to a loss of wetlands. A loss of wetlands changes the returns of cropping 
activities relative to wetland values; in areas where wetlands are lost, the opportunity cost of 
cropping is reduced. Thus, looking only at changes in crop yields will underestimate the effect 
of climate on wetlands, and it is important to consider the direct effect of climate on wetlands. 
This is done by estimating equation (30) for wetlands as well, with the left-hand-side variable 
now measured in terms of area and not as a yield. Therefore, scenario #2 examines the impact 
of climate change on wetlands acreage in addition to estimating the effect of climate on crop 
yields. This is done for each region of the PPR as climate change affects wetlands and crop 
yields differently in each region via equation (30). 
Finally, scenario #3 examines the impact of policies to mitigate climate change, namely, the 
Canadian government's Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) that was implemented in May 2008. 
This policy requires two percent renewable content in diesel fuel by 2010 and 5 percent by 
2015, which will increase the demand for canola oil and increase the net returns to planting 
canola in the Prairie Provinces. Mussell (2006) estimates that the price of canola will increase 
by $19 dollars per metric ton for the 2-percent blend and by $200 per ton for the 5-percent 
blend. For the PMP model, the RFS policy thus represents a 7% increase in the price of canola 
for the 2-percent blend and a 75% increase for the 5-percent blend. Since the latter result 
seems quite high, we consider the impact of increasing the price of canola by 10%. Scenario #3 
considers the direct climate effects on crops and wetlands, as well as the increased price of 
canola. 
Predicted Impact of Climate Change on Crop Yields and Wetlands Area 
The regression model (30) is estimated for each of the land use activities and wetlands using 
ordinary least squares with results provided in a table in the Appendix. For the most part, 
temperature and precipitation have a positive marginal impact on yields, with such effects 
significant at the 5% or 10% level. If a coefficient had a sign that was unexpected, was 
insignificant and reduced the adjusted R
2, it was not included in the specification (as indicted by 
an entry of na in the table). Based on the statistical significance of the coefficients, the 
regression model provided a better fit to the data in Alberta and Saskatchewan than in 
Manitoba.
12
                                                      
12 The reader will need to match strata and provinces using maps in Figure 3 or 7.  
 The same specification was employed for all strata for consistency. Based on the 
magnitudes of the coefficients, temperature has a bigger impact on crop yields in Alberta than   Page | 29 
in Saskatchewan or Manitoba, and precipitation has a similar effect across provinces. 
Climate change affects crop yields and wetlands areas. Assuming that landowners make no 
adjustments to input use (such as fertilizer) as a result of climate change, the projected changes 
in crop yields and wetlands area relative to historic values are provided in Table 7. For hay land 
and peas, for which there were no data, estimated effects are conservatively assumed based on 
the results for other crops. For wetlands, the values in Table 7 represent a decrease from 
historic levels in acres. For most crops in Table 7, the climate change scenario described earlier 
and employed here leads to an increase in crop yields, primarily because of warmer 
temperatures, with the impact highest for canola and lowest for wheat.  
Table 7: Change in Crop Yields and Wetlands Area due to 3
oC Higher Temperatures and 10% 
Lower Precipitation (10%), % Change by Stratum
a 
  Wheat  Barley  Oats  Canola  Dry Field Peas  Hay land  Wetlands 
26  14.00  19.00  13.00  39.8    10.00  -25.0 
27  6.22  8.80  7.55  20.23      -29.35 
28  17.40  16.58  13.46  30.24    15.79  -31.09 
29  16.56  14.92  9.22  32.2    16.22  -20.88 
30  -2.08  2.74  -1.05  5.42    -19.02  -54.03 
31  3.85  10.31  7.16  16.26  0.88    -43.24 
32  -3.56  -2.92  -9.85  3.71  0.15    -50.8 
33  11.84  12.83  16.40  15.05  34.76    -28.85 
34  6.69  12.02  6.06  25.18  5.10    -51.34 
35  -2.06  2.35  -2.26  5.54      -43.80 
36  -5.60  0.61  -1.37  7.24      -7.32 
37  13.42  21.98  14.98  3.48      -38.92 
38  9.49  16.64  17.88  26.68      -18.89 
39  -2.67  -4.54  -4.46  1.26      -35.00 
40  -1.36  5.28  3.27  15.64      -33.93 
a Projections based on the estimated coefficients in Appendix Table. 
 
Not surprisingly, impacts vary substantially by region, and in a few cases the decline in 
precipitation outweighs the temperature effect, leading to lower crop yields. In Alberta (strata 
26-29), climate change is projected to have a high positive impact on all crop yields in all strata. 
For several strata in Saskatchewan (strata 30-35) and Manitoba (strata 36-40), the increase in 
crop yields will be minimal or there may even be a decline. 
Climate change is projected, in our model, to reduce dramatically the area in wetlands as a 
result of warmer, drier conditions; the average reduction across regions is 29.3%. The reduction 
in Alberta is about average, the reduction in Saskatchewan is above average, and the reduction   Page | 30 
in Manitoba is below average. 
PMP Modeling Results 
The modeling results are provided in Tables 8 through 10. In Table 8, we provide the areas in 
each of the eight possible agricultural activities (various crops) and wetlands use for the PMP 
base-case replication of the observed land uses and each of the three climate scenarios that we 
identified above. Note that in the first five columns of Table 8, the social benefits of wetlands 
are added to the private costs of wetlands. In the last column, we consider total climate change 
results if only the private returns to wetlands are considered (i.e. wetlands represent a cost). 
This allows us to compare how climate change will impact wetlands management if they are 
privately managed versus management by a social planner.  In Table 9, the percentage changes 
in land allocation are provided for each of the fifteen strata, but only for scenario #3 using the 
social value of wetlands, while a summary of the reduction in wetlands under this same 
scenario is provided in Table 10. 
Table 8: Land Uses under Observed (2006), PMP Model Base Case and Climate Change 




wheat  Barley   Oats 
Winter 







land  Pasture 
Observed  14626.1  7799.6  4020.4  406.7  11257.8  2992.9  3782.1  10551.4  9059.0 
PMP Base  14621.1  7806.8  4019.1  409.2  11269.6  2975.3  3785.8  10562.6  9032.9 
#1  13988.9  8429.0  4087.8  430.5  17591.9  3207.8  3285.7  9036.5  4433.9 
#2  14563.1  8544.9  4111.5  433.4  17680.0  3311.2  1952.0  9132.4  4735.9 
#3 (social)  13823.2  7967.0  4058.2  427.3  20231.6  3139.0  1877.3  8646.5  4321.9 
#3 (private)  13959.4  8093.6  4083.4  430.8  20275.3  3298.8  831.5  8788.9  4730.2 
Source: Adapted from Withey and van Kooten (2011c) 
a Scenario #1 refers to change in crop yields due to increasing temperature by 3
oC and decreasing 
precipitation by 10%; scenario #2 is the same as #1 but adds the projected change in wetlands under the 
same climate scenario; and scenario #3 adds to #2 an increase in the price of canola of 10%. Under 
scenario #3, two scenarios are considered depending on whether wetlands are valued at their social or 
only private net benefit. 
 
Several trends are discernable from the tables. First, in terms of cropland, the changes modeled 
under scenario #1 suggest that climate change has the most pronounced positive effect on 
canola and barley plantings. This is not surprising given the yield changes expected as a result of 
climate change as indicted in Table 7. Compared to canola and barley, optimal plantings of most 
other field crops increase marginally, while those of spring wheat decline by between 0.5 and 
5.5 percent, depending on the scenario. However, plantings of winter wheat are projected to 
increase (thus benefitting waterfowl that nest in winter wheat), although overall acreage in 
winter wheat remains small. As noted, canola planting increases by more than 50% as a result   Page | 31 
of climate change, but plantings are boosted by another 15% or so when biofuel policies 
increase the price of canola.  
Table 9: Change in Land Use from Base Case by Stratum, Scenario #3 using Social Benefits of 
Wetlands (%)  
Stratum 
Spring 
wheat  Barley   Oats 
Winter 
wheat  Canola 
Dry field 
peas  Wetlands 
Hay 
land  Pasture 
26  -21.1  -36.1  -6.5  -20.5  298.1  -100.0  -67.6  -84.7  -100.0 
27  -11.1  -23.4  -0.4  -13.0  197.2  -100.0  -45.4  -11.3  -54.4 
28  15.7  29.5  14.9  16.9  50.5  32.2  -47.4  2.7  -100.0 
29  20.9  34.0  12.4  22.6  56.8  40.2  -31.5  12.8  -88.2 
30  -6.2  10.9  -1.1  -4.0  19.0  8.4  -53.1  -26.7  11.1 
31  -0.2  17.9  8.5  -2.2  38.8  -50.8  -51.0  -4.1  -81.0 
32  -10.4  3.6  -11.6  -2.2  34.2  14.1  -45.9  0.9  16.2 
33  7.9  20.0  12.7  23.4  26.1  43.8  -35.0  -11.5  -18.3 
34  1.1  16.4  3.7  3.4  56.8  -30.4  -59.2  -3.3  -37.8 
35  -7.3  -0.6  -6.4  -10.4  75.4  -76.3  -46.0  -5.0  -7.2 
36  -12.4  -0.2  -2.1  -36.1  17.9  18.2  -6.9  -9.1  -1.5 
37  27.9  52.2  13.4  23.1  12.3  36.6  -47.2  10.5  -70.9 
38  0.1  10.4  9.3  0.1  34.1  -9.9  -66.4  -23.4  -100.0 
39  -32.9  -50.7  -4.6  -14.1  27.4  714.5  -33.7  -2.1  3.2 
40  -10.1  3.1  0.8  -8.5  29.8  195.9  -41.5  -9.7  -28.1 
Total  -5.5  2.1  1.0  4.4  79.5  5.5  -50.4  -18.1  -52.2 
Source: Withey and van Kooten (2011c) 
 
Table 10: Reduction in Wetlands by Stratum, Scenario #3 using Social Benefits of Wetlands 
('000s ac) 
  Stratum   
Scenario
a  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  Total 
Base   459  140  145  103  388  532  542  74  557  221  65  223  50  158  128  3786 
#3 (social)  149  76  76  71  182  261  293  48  227  119  61  118  17  105  75  1877 
Source: Withey and van Kooten (2011c) 
a See note on Table 8. 
 
Wetlands area is projected to decrease by about 13% due to the increased value of crops 
relative to wetlands (scenario #1), but, when the direct effect of climate change on wetlands is 
factored in (scenario #2), wetlands are reduced by an additional 35%, or by some one-half of 
observed area. Finally, consider what happens when the price of canola rises (scenario #3). If 
the social value of wetlands is used as the basis for scenario #3, wetlands area changes little 
from that in scenario #2, but, if social values are ignored by a private landowner, wetlands area 
falls by about 80% from that observed today. Meanwhile, the amount of land in pasture is 
projected to fall by about one-half in all three scenarios, because its value falls significantly   Page | 32 
compared to that of other land uses.  
Notice that the above results are consistent with those presented in the earlier sections of this 
paper. The magnitudes are similar to those found using an  optimal control model that 
estimates the effect of climate and biofuel policies on wetlands (section 3.1).  
Tables 9 and 10 summarize what happens at the strata level, at least for scenario #3 when the 
private landowner is provided incentives to take into account the social values of wetlands. The 
change in wetlands across regions in the PPR is not constant, ranging from a loss of between 
seven and nearly 70 percent (Table 9), or four to 330 acres (Table 10). Unsurprisingly, the effect 
of climate change and climate change policies on wetlands is not homogenous across regions, 
because climate and soil characteristics (which impact crop yields and crop revenue) differ 
dramatically across the study region. In Table 9, the largest proportional declines in wetlands 
are in strata 26, 38, 34, 30 and 31, while the largest decreases in wetlands area are in strata 34, 
26, 31, 32 and 30. Thus, wetlands loss is greatest in northern Alberta (stratum 26) and 
Saskatchewan (strata 30, 31, 32 and 34).  
Recall that, in the land-use model, changes in wetlands in each stratum are driven primarily by 
the actual climate effect on wetlands area as determined from the relation in the Appendix 
table. However, the social benefits of wetlands and the opportunity cost of retaining them are 
given by the net returns to other land uses in the region; this also affects wetlands loss. Further, 
the net returns to other crops are impacted by climate-induced changes in crop yields and via 
the increased price of canola caused by biofuel policies to address climate change. Overall, 
therefore, there is a direct climate impact on wetlands and an indirect impact resulting from 
increases in net returns to cropping. Based on these factors, we can identify the potential 
drivers of the provincial patterns of wetlands loss as indicated in Tables 9 and 10. In doing so, it 
is helpful to consult Figure 7. 
The largest actual reduction in wetlands area is projected to occur in Saskatchewan (strata 
30-35). This is due in part to the fact that the largest areas of  wetlands are found in 
Saskatchewan, while some of the largest proportional declines are also projected to occur in 
Saskatchewan, particularly in strata 30, 31 and 34. The declines in wetlands in these strata are 
driven by severe climate impacts (see Table 7), while increased crop yields in strata 31 and 34 
also reduce the relative value of wetlands. Overall, wetland loss in Saskatchewan is only slight 
greater than the PPR average of 50%.  
Wetlands loss in Alberta (strata 26-39) is projected to total 56%, which is the largest 
proportional loss of wetlands in the three provinces. The reason relates primarily to strata 26, 
because of large plantings of canola, which is the dominant crop in this area. Canola plantings in 
strata 26 are projected to increase significantly under climate change, and especially if   Page | 33 
governments aggressively pursue biofuel policies (see Table 10). Two of the other three strata 
in Alberta are also projected to lose wetlands. Climate effects on wetlands are below average in 
these strata, but crop yields are significantly increased due to a warmer climate, implying that 
cropping becomes a more valuable activity compared to retaining land in wetlands. The 
significant loss of wetlands in Alberta is consistent with our earlier projections using an optimal-
control, bioeconomic model (see section 3.1 above).  
Finally, the overall projected reduction in wetlands in Manitoba is smaller than the other 
provinces. While the proportional loss of wetlands in stratum 38 could be large, the associated 
actual loss in area is quite small. Because average climate change impacts on both wetlands and 
crop yields are smaller than for the other provinces, the overall wetlands loss in Manitoba is 
also well below the PPR average, but still significant at 40 percent.  
Conclusions 
The various analyses of wetland conservation and, by implication, the prospects for migratory 
waterfowl contain several common threads. First, based on the external or spillover benefits 
that wetlands provide, whether ecosystem service functions, viewscape value and/or value to 
hunters as breeding habitat, it is clear that current wetlands area is likely below the socially 
desirable level. Just how far below depends on what values are assigned to the various off-site 
benefits and to whom such benefits accrue. And, as demonstrated for the case of biofuel (bio-
diesel) policies, one can conclude that government agricultural programs, such as direct 
subsidies, assignment of quota under the Canadian Wheat Board quota system, tax breaks for 
land development, et cetera, will also impact wetlands and migratory waterfowl populations 
(see van Kooten 1993a, 1993b; van Kooten and Bulte 2000).  
It turns out that projected climate change is likely to have an adverse effect on wetlands and 
migratory waterfowl. All of the models considered in this study bear this out. Further, and 
somewhat disconcerting, there is some evidence to suggest that policies to encourage 
production of energy crops might pose a greater threat to wetlands and waterfowl than climate 
change itself. The models presented in this study indicate that large decreases in wetlands area 
can be expected in Alberta and Saskatchewan, with much smaller impacts in Manitoba. Given 
that climate change will have the greatest impact on wetlands in Saskatchewan, decision 
makers may wish to devote more effort to protecting wetlands in that province rather than in 
Alberta or Manitoba. 
Even if the account is taken of the adverse impacts of climate, it will still be socially desirable to 
have more wetlands than the amounts projected by land use models that ignore the external 
spillover benefits of wetlands. Should the climate become warmer and drier, there will be a   Page | 34 
shift in optimal wetlands conservation from west to east, a result consistent with Johnson et al. 
(2005). It will be optimal to have more wetlands in Manitoba than Alberta, which has not been 
the case historically. Relative to current conditions, with climate change Manitoba is projected 
to have the most productive waterfowl habitat. This suggests that  Manitoba is a second 
province where policy should target wetlands protection, although it remains an open question 
as to whether Manitoba can make up for the loss of wetlands in Saskatchewan.   Page | 35 
Appendix Table: Estimated Parameters of the Climate Regression Model (28)  
Stratum  Parameter  Wheat  Barley  Oats  Canola  Hay  Peas  Wetlands 
26  β0  -1.7  -10.9  0.31  -9.62       
  β1  2.22**  3.88**  3.59**  2.98**       
  β2  0.042**  0.059**  0.067**  0.012       
27  β0  -3.23  -2.58  -0.32  -8.71      0.19** 
  β1  1.27  2.1*  2.31*  1.87**      -0.009 
  β2  0.049**  0.063**  0.073**  0.029**      3.43E-0.5 
28  β0  -9.06  -10.08  -11.05  -20.5*  -0.25    0.267** 
  β1  2.12**  3.19**  3.18**  2.77**  0.118*    -0.001** 
  β2  0.04**  0.055**  0.07**  0.03**  0.002*    -0.0002** 
29  β0  -18.8  -19.3  -17.1  -30.5**  -0.88    0.157** 
  β1  2.29**  3.21**  2.78**  3.06**  0.13**    -0.006* 
  β2  0.037*  0.05**  0.06**  0.03**  0.001**    na 
30  β0  2.57  -0.49  -1.76  5.87  1.08    0.23** 
  β1  0.51  1.42  1.27  0.75**  na    -0.033 
  β2  0.057**  0.08**  0.12**  0.028  0.0019    0.0007 
31  β0  11.25  5.42  4.8  4.46    7.97  0.52** 
  β1  0.76  2.12**  2.33**  1.43**    0.63  -0.052** 
  β2  0.029**  0.05*  0.078*  0.018**    0.042**  0.00055** 
32  β0  13.66  22.4  29.29  6.63    19.43  1.16 
  β1  na  0.01  na  0.48    0.64  -0.077** 
  β2  0.028**  0.04**  0.054**  0.02**    0.005  na 
33  β0  -8.77  -16.03  -33.3*  -2    -32.4  0.18 
  β1  1.47**  2.41**  3.8**  1.21**    3.67**  -0.009* 
  β2  0.05**  0.08**  0.12**  0.02**    0.086**  na 
34  β0  10.83*  8.07  12.33  7.41    13.58  0.92* 
  β1  0.92  2.25*  1.92  1.74**    0.75  -0.07* 
  β2  0.02**  0.04**  0.055**  0.001    0.02  Na 
35  β0  12.7  12.59  18.84  4.34      0.65** 
  β1  0.14  0.81  0.36  0.62      -0.04** 
  β2  0.02**  0.03**  0.05**  0.02**      na 
36  β0  14.89*  23.5  25.45**  11.95      0.05 
  β1  na  0.06  0.27  0.36*      -0.0008 
  β2  0.034**  0.005  0.02  na      2.86E-0.5 
37  β0  18.59**  18.77  33.88*  6.7      0.39** 
  β1  1.4*  3.26**  2.79*  0.18      -0.02** 
  β2  0.002  na  na  0.004      0.0001 
38  β0  10.36  8.24  -9.15**  -7.94      0.07** 
  β1  1.32  3.15*  4.36**  2.47**      -0.0029 
  β2  0.02*  0.027  0.057**  0.021*      na 
39  β0  22.36  21.82*  28.17**  5.96      0.28 
  β1  Na  na  na  0.35      -0.017** 
  β2  0.019**  0.039**  0.05**  0.019**      na 
40  β0  26.57  22.63*  22.84  2.81      0.32** 
  β1  0.01  1.27  1.37  1.38*      -0.02** 
  β2  0.01  0.03*  0.05**  0.017**      na 
*indicates significance at 10%; ** indicates significance at 5%   Page | 36 
References 
Baldassarre, G. A., E.G. Bolen and D.A. Saunders, 1994. Waterfowl Ecology and Management. 
New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.  
Belcher, K. C.K. Edwards and B. Gray. 2001. Ecological Fiscal Reform and Agricultural 
Landscapes, Analysis of Economic Instruments: Conservation Cover Incentive Program. 
Background Paper, Ecological Fiscal Reform, National Roundtable on the Economy and 
Environment, Ottawa, ON. 
Bethke, R.W. and T.D. Nudds, 1995. Effects of Climate  Change and Land  Use on Duck 
Abundance in Canadian Prairie-Parklands, Ecolological Applications 5(3): 588-600. 
Brown, G.M. and J. Hammack, 1973. Dynamic Economic Management of Migratory Waterfowl, 
Review of Economics and Statistics 55(1): 73-82. 
Brown, G.M., J. Hammack and M.F. Tillman, 1976. Mallard Population Dynamics and 
Management Models, Journal of Wildlife Management 40(3): 542-555. 
Clark, C, 1976. Mathematical Bioeconomics. New York: Wiley. 
Cortus, G., S. Jeffrey, J. Untershultz and P. Boxall, 2010. The Economics of Wetland Drainage 
and Retention in Saskatchewan, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 59(1): 109-126. 
Cowardin, L. M., T. L. Shaffer and P.M. Arnold. 1995. Evaluation of Duck Habitat and Estimation 
of Duck Population Sizes with a Remote-Sensing-Based System. U.S. Department of the Interior, 
National Biological Service, Biological Science Report 2, Washington, D.C., USA. 
Crutzen, P.J., A.R. Mosier, K.A. Smith and W. Winiwarter, 2008. N2O Release from Agro-biofuel 
Production Negates Global Warming Reduction by Replacing Fossil Fuels, Atmospheric 
Chemistry and Physics 8: 389-395. 
CWS, 2004. North American Waterfowl Management Plan: Implementation Framework. 
Ottawa, ON: Minister of Environment, Canadian Wildlife Service.  
Hammack, J. and G.M Brown, Jr., 1974. Waterfowl and Wetlands: Toward Bioeconomic 
Analysis. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Hansen, L.T., 2009. The Viability of Creating Wetlands for the Sale of Carbon Offsets, Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 34(2): 350-365. 
Hill, M.R.J., D.G. McMaster, T. Harrison, A. Herschmiller and T. Plews, 2011. A Reverse Auction 
for Wetland Restoration in the Assiniboine River Watershed, Saskatchewan, Canadian Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 59(2): In press. 
Howitt, R.E., 1995. Positive Mathematical Programming,  American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 77 (May): 329-342. 
Johnson, W.C., B.V. Millett, T. Gilmanov, R.A. Voldseth, G.R Guntenspergen and D.E. Naugic, 
2005. Vulnerability of Northern Prairie Wetlands to Climate Change, BioScience 55: 863-872.   Page | 37 
Johnson, W.C., B. Werner, G.R. Gunmtenspergen, R.A. Voldseth, B. Millet, D.E. Naugle, M. 
Tulbure, R. Carroll, J. Tracy and C. Olawsky, 2010. Prairie Wetland Complexes as Landscape 
Functional Units in a Changing Climate, BioScience 60(2): 128-140. 
Léonard, D. and N. van Long, 1992. Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in 
Economics. Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press. 
Loomis, J.B., 2000. Economic Values of Wilderness Recreation and Passive Use: What We Think 
We Know at the Beginning of the 21st Century. In Wilderness Science in a Time of Change – 
Volume 2: Wilderness Within the Context of Larger Systems by S.F. McCool, D.N. Cole, W.T. 
Borrie and J. O’Loughlin. Proceedings RMRS-P-15-VOL-2 Conference held May 23-27, 1999 held 
at Missoula, MT. Ogden, UT: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain 
Research Station. 
Loomis, J.B. and D.S. White, 1996. Economic Benefits of Rare and Endangered Species: 
Summary and Meta-analysis, Ecological Economics 18(3): 197-206. 
NAWMP Committee, 2009. Canadian Habitat Matters 2008 Annual Report. Available at 
(accessed April 12, 2010): www.nawmp.ca/pdf/HabMat2009-final-e.pdf  
Pattison, J., P.C. Boxall and W.L. Adamowicz, 2011. The Economic Benefits of Wetland Retention 
and Restoration in Manitoba, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 59(2): In press. 
Porter, R.M. and G.C. van Kooten, 1993. Wetlands Preservation on the Canadian Prairies: The 
Problem of the Public Duck, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 41: 401-410. 
Searchinger, T., R. Heimlich, R.A. Houghton, F. Dong, A. Elobeid, J. Fabiosa, S. Tokgoz, D. Hayes 
and T. Yu, 2008. Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases through 
Emissions from Land-use Change, Science 319(29 February): 1238-1240. 
Searchinger, T.D., S.P. Hamburg, J. Melillo, W. Chameides, P. Havlik, D.M. Kammen, G.E. Likens, 
R.N. Lubowski, M. Obersteiner, M. Oppenheimer, G.P. Robertson, W.H. Schlesinger, G.D. 
Tilman, 2009. Fixing a Critical Climate Accounting Error, Science 326(23 October): 527-528. 
Statistics Canada, 2006. Census Agricultural Regions Cartographic Boundary File. Ottawa, ON: 
Statistics Canada.  
U.S. Department of Interior and Environment Canada, 1986. North American Waterfowl 
Management Plan. Washington, DC: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 19pp. 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2010a. Waterfowl Population Status, 2010. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of the Interior. 80pp.  Available at  (accessed May 13, 2011): 
www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/NewReportsPublications/PopulationStatus.html. 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2010b. Waterfowl Breeding Population & Habitat Survey Strata 
Estimate Data. Division of Migratory Bird Management, Migratory Bird Data Center. Available at 
(accessed May 13, 2011): http://migbirdapps.fws.gov/ 
van Kooten, G.C. and E.H. Bulte, 2000. The Economics of Nature: Managing Biological Assets. 
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. (512pp.)   Page | 38 
van Kooten, G.C. and A. Schmitz, 1992. Preserving Waterfowl Habitat on the Canadian Prairies: 
Economic Incentives vs. Moral Suasion, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74: 79-89. 
van Kooten, G.C., 1993a. Bioeconomic Evaluation of Government Programs on Wetlands 
Conversion, Land Economics 69: 27-38. 
van Kooten, G.C., 1993b. Preservation of Waterfowl Habitat in Western Canada: Is the North 
American Waterfowl Management Plan a Success? Natural Resources Journal 33(Summer): 759-
75. 
van Kooten, G.C., P. Withey and L. Wong, 2011. Bioeconomic Modeling of Wetlands and 
Waterfowl in Western Canada: Accounting for Amenity Values, Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 59(2): In press. 
Watmough M.D. and M.J. Schmoll.  2007.  Environment Canada’s Prairie and Northern Region 
Habitat Monitoring Program  Phase II: Recent Habitat Trends in the Prairie Habitat Joint 
Venture. Habitat Conservation and Assessment Division, Canadian Wildlife Service, 
Environmental Conservation Branch. 
Wilkins, K.A. and E.g. Cooch, 1999. Waterfowl Population Status, 1999. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service, Department of the Interior, Washington, DC. 33pp.+appendices. Available at (accessed 
May 13, 2011): www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/NewReportsPublications/PopulationStatus.html 
Withey, P. and G.C. van Kooten, 2011a. The Effect of Climate Change on Optimal Wetlands and 
Waterfowl Management in Western Canada, Ecological Economics 70(4): 798-805. 
Withey, P. and G.C. van Kooten, 2011b. The Effect of Climate Change on Optimal Wetlands and 
Waterfowl Management in Western Canada: Incorporating Cropping  Decisions into a 
Bioeconomic Model. Submitted to Environmental & Resource Economics, February. 
Withey, P. and G.C. van Kooten, 2011c. The Effect of Climate Change on Land Use and Wetlands 
Conservation in Western Canada: An Application of Positive Mathematical Programming. REPA 
Working Paper 2011-02. Victoria, BC: Department of Economics, University of Victoria. 
Wong, L., G.C. van Kooten and J.A. Clarke, 2011. The Impact of Agriculture on Waterfowl 
Abundance: Evidence from Panel Data. REPA Working Paper 2011-01. 36pp. Resource 
Economics and Policy Analysis Research Group, Department of Economics, University of 
Victoria, Victoria, Canada. 
Yu, J. and K. Belcher, 2011. An Economic Analysis of Landowners’ Willingness to Adopt Wetland 
and Riparian Conservation Management, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 59(2): In 
press. 